VULNERABILITY INTELLIGENCE

CVE-2026-43038

CVSS score9.8 CRITICAL
EPSS probability0.26%
CISA KEVNot currently listed
Published2026-05-01
Last modified2026-10-19
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info? Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this? This patch implements the first suggestion. I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway.

Weakness classification

  • nvd@nist.gov: NVD-CWE-noinfo
  • 134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0: CWE-787
  • 0b0ca135-0b70-47e7-9f44-1890c2a1c46c: CWE-843

Primary references